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type I error (false positive)

Rejecting a true H0: declaring an effect that does not exist. Its probability is alpha.

A hypothesis test ends with a decision, and a decision can be wrong in two different ways. Cross the truth with the decision and you get four outcomes:

H0H_0 true (no real effect)
H0H_0 false (real effect)
Reject H0H_0 ("it works!")
type I error, false positive
correct: power, 1−β1 - \beta
Don't reject H0H_0 ("no evidence")
correct
type II error, false negative

A type I error is declaring a win that isn't there: you ship a checkout change that actually does nothing. Its probability, when H0H_0 is true, is the significance level α\alpha you chose, usually 5%. A type II error is missing an effect that is real: a good idea gets shelved because the test "showed nothing". Its probability is β\beta, and 1−β1 - \beta is the test's statistical power. A common target is 80% power, meaning β=20%\beta = 20\%.

The two errors pull against each other. Lowering α\alpha from 5% to 1% makes false wins rarer but, with the same sample, makes misses more common. The main way to reduce both at once is more data (or less noisy metrics); that is what sample size calculations are for.

Which error is worse depends on the business. A false positive costs engineering time and can quietly hurt a metric you weren't watching. A false negative costs the revenue of an idea you never launched. Two situations inflate type I errors far above α\alpha: checking many metrics or variants (the multiple comparisons problem), and peeking at a running test and stopping the moment it looks significant.

Example

CatChow's product team runs checkout tests with 1,000 users per group, two-sided, α=0.05\alpha = 0.05.

Type I error: the copy tweaks that did nothing. Over a quarter the team tests 20 small button-copy changes. Suppose none of them has any real effect, so H0H_0 is true every time. Each test still has a 5% chance of a false win:

  • expected false positives: 20×0.05=120 \times 0.05 = 1
  • chance of at least one: 1−0.9520≈1−0.358=0.641 - 0.95^{20} \approx 1 - 0.358 = 0.64

So there is about a 64% chance the quarterly report celebrates at least one "winning" copy change that is pure noise.

Type II error: the redesign that really works. Now suppose a redesign truly lifts conversion from 5% to 6%. With 1,000 users per group the standard error of the difference is about 0.05×0.95/1000+0.06×0.94/1000≈0.0102\sqrt{0.05 \times 0.95 / 1000 + 0.06 \times 0.94 / 1000} \approx 0.0102, so the real 1 pp lift is only about 0.01/0.0102≈0.980.01 / 0.0102 \approx 0.98 standard errors. The test declares a win only when ∣z∣>1.96|z| > 1.96, so the power is roughly

P(Z>1.96−0.98)=P(Z>0.98)≈0.16P(Z > 1.96 - 0.98) = P(Z > 0.98) \approx 0.16

That gives β≈0.84\beta \approx 0.84: the test misses this real lift about 5 times out of 6. For 80% power the team would need about 8,150 users per group.

Same team, same α\alpha: in the first case too many false wins, in the second a near-certain miss. The fix for the second is sample size; the fix for the first is fewer, pre-registered tests or a multiple-comparison correction.

Common mistakes

  • Reading α as "the chance our winner is fake". α is the false-positive rate among tests where nothing is going on; the share of your declared winners that are fake can be much higher, especially when most ideas don't work.
  • Ignoring type II errors. An underpowered test that "found nothing" often gets an idea killed; check the power before calling a result negative.
  • Peeking and stopping early. Checking daily and stopping at the first p < 0.05 pushes the real type I error rate well above 5%.
  • Testing many metrics and reporting the one that moved. With 20 independent metrics and no real effects, the chance of at least one false positive is about 64%.
  • Lowering α without adding data. Fewer false wins, but more missed real effects; only a bigger sample or less noisy metric improves both.

Learn it in the course

  • The t-test · Comparing the means of two groups and deciding whether the gap is bigger than chance.